Good. Now please modify the control over account ownership to be subject to voter review with at least 30–60+ day delays like in white paper as currently BP’s can confiscate accounts in moments.

DPoS was always about decentralizing control to voters with any actions taken by block producers possible to be undone by voters to keep the temporary BP actions fully reversible (e.g. breaking censorship by removing BP’s) so voters were at most temporarily granting BP some rights and be up to voters for review on or off chain.

EOS codebase allows instantaneous changes to ownership of any account by >2/3 BP. That is irreversible damage and complete change in authority and trust models that would be reacting to disasters instead of preventing them. On-chain governance doesn’t mean it has to be easy. 30–60 day delay minimums for changes to system contract can be validated by full nodes. Tezos like 80% sliding scale for change approve/disapprove protocol changes for voters directly as a second house of control for checks and balances would be another huge improvement (lower barrier to approval takes more time). These don’t have to be wet-code when they can be done with protocol or contract code.

Furthermore, built in design to distribute inflation to those with vested stake would significantly increase the cost to bribe for votes & can compensate by burning more from RAM trades. And finally increase unvesting time to reduce effect of exchanges & increase voter incentive alignment — the change to 3 days was last minute and not explained at all. Time delays were an important tool for security & incentives that has been reduced to nothingness.

Some of this stuff doesn’t even have to be enabled by default.